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Abstract. Although most of the predicted consequences of the internet-revolution
in the 90s did not become reality, the internet has lead to sustainable changes in the
organization of most industries. In particular, this is true for business-to-business
(B2B) relations between firm. An obvious ‘proof’ for this is the rising number of so-
called electronic markets—especially for B2B transactions—since several years. This
paper should help to give a better understanding of the organizational impacts of
electronic markets in the context of B2B relations. Therefore we use the incomplete
contract framework to build a simple model of a repeated game. It will be shown that
the existence of an (alternative) electronic market could influence the willingness to
cooperate between the up- and the downstream firm in a B2B-relationship. In our
special case, the willingness to cooperate by the buyer will decline.
Keywords: Business-to-Business, Electronic Markets, Industry Structure, Repeated
Games
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. . . why is there any organization?
Ronald H. Coase, In The Nature of the Firm (1937)
1. Introduction
Up to now much has been written about the economic consequences
of the internet. Especially the topic of electronic commerce has been
extensively analyzed1. In contrast to this, little research exists about
the long-run impacts of electronic markets on the industry structure.
Of course, there are some papers explaining the impact of electronic
markets on business-to-customer relationships2, their properties in gen-
eral3 and their property to decrease transaction costs4. But on the
other hand, up to now only few work has been done in the context
∗ Institute for Economics and Law, Department of Microeconomics and Spatial
Economics, University of Stuttgart, Keplerstraße 17, 70174 Stuttgart, Germany.
1 For an excellent survey hereto see Kauffman and Walden (2001).
2 See e. g. Bakos (1997).
3 See Bakos (1991) and Smith et al. (1999).
4 See Bakos (1998), Brown and Goolsbee (2002) and Brynjolfsson and Smith
(2000).
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Figure 1. A simple vertical buyer-supplier relation
B2B-relationships. In fact, this is an important gap in recent research,
because these relationships are likely to be affected most by the inter-
net. Although their property to decrease transaction costs seems to be
quite clear, the fact of decreasing transaction cost by electronic markets
is not the only impact of electronic markets on the economics of the
firm(s).
The fact that the internet has deep strategic impacts was first re-
alized in the field of business administration5, while the economic re-
search has ignored this fact for a long time. This work should help
to give a better understanding of the strategic effects of electronic
markets in the context of B2B-relationships and should also inspire
further research in this area.
This paper is organized as follows: first, in section 2.1, we give a short
overview about the technological assumptions of our model. Then in
section 2.2, we discuss the case of relation-specific investments in an
incomplete contract setting. After that, in section 2.3, we analyze the
investment decision of one buyer and one supplier in the context of a
repeated game. After that, in section 2.4, we extend our model to the
case of an existing alternative electronic markets and show the impact
of it on the willingness of the buyer to cooperate. Finally, in chapter 3,
we summarize our results and discuss some fields of further research.
2. The Model
2.1. Technological Assumptions
Let us first take a look at the case of a simple vertical relationship
between a downstream buyer and an upstream supplier, as shown in
figure 1. In the following we denote the upstream supplier with U and
the downstream buyer with D. We assume that both—the supplier and
the buyer—are risk-neutral. Both want to agree on the supply of one
5 For a critical discussion about the impact of the internet on business adminis-
tration see Porter (2001).
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3unit of a non-divisible good. This good has a value to the buyer D
of v ∈ IR+, whereas v ∈ [v, v] with v > 0, v < ∞ and v > v. The
buyer D has the possibility to increase the value of the good through
an investment ID, i. e. the value of the good after the investment is
v(ID). The production of the good raises production costs of c ∈ IR+
on the supplier U , whereas c ∈ [c, c] with c > 0, c <∞ and c > c. The
supplier has also the possibility to reduce the production costs through
an investment IU , i. e. after the investment his production costs are
c(IU ). To focus on the problem of the investment level we suppose that
trade is always efficient, i. e. v(ID) > c(IU ),∀ IU , ID.6 To simplify the
analysis further we suppose that both, IU and ID, could only be chosen
discrete, this means that IU ∈ {0, 1} and ID ∈ {0, 1}. We also suppose
that v(1) > v(0) and that c(0) > c(1). Besides that, we assume that
the largest possible cost-saving is 1 < ∆c := c(0) − c(1) < 2 and that
the largest possible increase of value is 1 < ∆v := v(1) − v(0) < 2.
Additionally we normalize the investment costs for both to 1. Hence,
the profit of the supplier is
piU = p− c(IU )− IU ,
whereas p denotes the negotiated price between the buyer and the
supplier. Therefore the profit of the buyer is
piD = v(ID)− p− ID.
2.2. Relation-Specific Investments
First of all we want to demonstrate the implications of relation-specific
investments in our model.7 Therefore we suppose that it is not possible
to write a complete contract, i. e. ex ante it is not possible to write a
binding contracts over the level of investment for both, the buyer and
the supplier. This could for example be case if both investments, the
investment of the supplier IU and the investment of the buyer ID, could
be observed but not be verified by a third party.8 Our model induces
the following game, as shown in figure 2.
6 In particular we suppose that v > c.
7 The following model is an adapted version of the model from Tirole. For further
details consult Tirole (1990), pp. 21.
8 This situation is the same as to say it is prohibitively expensive to specify the
level of investment ex ante within a complete contract.
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Figure 2. Game structure of the model with relation-specific investments
First in period t = 0 both, the buyer and the supplier, have to decide
simultaneously about their level of investment. After that, in period
t = 1, they both bargain about the price of the good p. This induces a
two stage sequential game which can be solved via backward induction.
Therefore we start our analysis at the last period of the game—in period
t = 1. For the bargaining process about the price p we assume it leads
to the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution9.
Now, let us start in period t = 1. From the assumption of a Nash
bargaining solution it follows that trade occurs if,
p− c(IU ) = v(ID)− p.
Hence, the equilibrium price is
pˆ =
v(ID) + c(IU )
2
.
Observe that the price pˆ increases in IU as well as in ID. The price pˆ
leads to a profit of the supplier of
piU =
v(ID) + c(IU )
2
− c(IU )− IU ,
respectively
piU =
v(ID)− c(IU )
2
− IU .
To calculate the optimal investment level of the supplier, he solves the
optimization problem
max
IU∈{0,1}
piU =
v(ID)− c(IU )
2
− IU .
9 See Nash (1950). About their application within economic modelling and for
a comparison between the Nash bargaining solution with the strategic bargaining
solution of Rubinstein see Binmore et al. (1986). For details about the bargaining
solution of Rubinstein see Rubinstein (1982).
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Therefore the profit of the buyer is
piD = v(ID)−
v(ID) + c(IU )
2
− ID,
respectively
piD =
v(ID)− c(IU )
2
− ID.
For the buyer to find his optimal investment level he solves the opti-
mization problem
max
ID∈{0,1}
piD =
v(ID)− c(IU )
2
− ID.
This also results in an optimal investment level of IˆD = 0.11 Hence, in
equilibrium neither the buyer nor the supplier will make an investment.
After we have calculated the optimal investment level of the buyer
and the supplier, we are now ready to investigate the welfare-optimizing
level of investment. This welfare-optimizing level of investment is de-
terminated by the the solution of the optimization problem
max
IU ,ID∈{0,1}
W = v(ID)− c(IU )− IU − ID.
By solving the above optimization problem the welfare-optimizing level
of investment is therefore IˆU = 1, IˆD = 1.12 From the result above the
following proposition can be stated.
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose that all assumptions of our model holds:
if in a bilateral relationship a buyer and a supplier have to invest in
relation-specific assets and the level of investment is not verifiable—
i. e. there cannot be written a complete contract that specifies the level
of investment ex ante—, then the resulting level of investment will be
welfare-inferior.
10 Because we have assumed that the largest possible cost-saving is ∆c := c(0)−
c(1) < 2, it results from the fact that v(I
D)−c(0)
2
>
v(ID)−c(1)
2
− 1 that piU (IU =
0) > piU (IU = 1).
11 Because we have assumed that the largest possible value-increase is ∆v :=
v(1) − v(0) < 2, it results from the fact that v(0)−c(I
U )
2
>
v(1)−c(IU )
2
− 1 that
piD(ID = 0) > piD(ID = 1).
12 From the fact that ∆v > 1 and ∆c > 1 it can be concluded that ∆v +∆c > 2,
which is equivalent to v(1) − c(1) − 2 > v(0) − c(0). Form this it can be finally
concluded that W (IU = 1, ID = 1) > W (IU = 0, ID = 0). It is also easy to show
that for all other cases Iˆ = (1, 1) is the maximum.
B2B.tex; 7/05/2004; 10:51; p.5
6Table I. Bi-matrix of the induced game Γ
ID
IU
0 1
0
piD(0, 0),
piU (0, 0)
piD(0, 1),
piU (1, 0)
1
piD(1, 0),
piU (0, 1)
piD(1, 1),
piU (1, 1)
It is easy to perceive that the result is the well-known phenomena
of underinvestment in relation-specific assets. This is due to the fact
that only half of the value of the investment can privately internalized,
because the level of investment cannot be verified and because of the
chosen bargaining mechanism. One solution of this problem would e. g.
be the integration of the two firms.13
2.3. Repeated Interaction
In contrast to section (2.2) we now investigate the case of repeated
interaction. Therefore we need a little bit of additional notation. First
we define pii(Ii, I−i), i = U,D as the profit of player i, if he invests Ii
and his opponent −i, invests I−i. This leads to the stage game Γ whose
bi-matrix is shown in table I. For the payoffs we assume that
pii(0, 0) > pii(1, 0), i = U,D (1)
and that
pii(0, 1) > pii(1, 1), i = U,D.
From the observation of table I it becomes clear that the game Γ has
the structure of the well-known ‘prisoner’s dilemma’.14 Therefore it
follows that the only unique Nash-equilibrium is that both—neither
the supplier U nor the buyer D—invests, i. e. the Nash-equilibrium is
Iˆ = (IˆU = 0, IˆD = 0). This states the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2. If the game Γ is played as an one-shot game, then
the only unique Nash-equilibrium is that neither the supplier U nor the
buyer D invests. Formally, the Nash-equilibrium is given by
Iˆ = (IˆU = 0, IˆD = 0).
13 Under specific circumstances an option contract could be another solution of
this problem. See No¨ldeke and Schmidt (1995) and Maskin and Tirole (1999). Ad-
ditionally, in some cases the ex ante determination of the renegotiation design could
solve this investment problem, too. See Aghion et al. (1994).
14 For a classical interpretation of the prisoner’s dilemma consult Luce and Raiffa
(1957), p. 95.
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7So, is there any possibility to induce cooperate behavior in game Γ?
One obvious possibility would be to investigate the repeated play of
game Γ. Therefore we need some additional notation. Let us denote
the investment decision of player i in period t with Iit , the strategy
profile of player i and −i (the opponent) in period t with It = (I
i
t , I
−i
t )
and the equilibrium strategy profile in period t with Iˆt = (Iˆ
i
t , Iˆ
−i
t ). In
the following sections we assume that the stage game Γ is static in that
sense that the payoffs of the players are constant over time. First we
will originate that the game Γ will be repeated finitely, i. e. game Γ
will be played in t = 0, . . . , T with T < ∞. If this is the case it can
easily be shown by ‘backward induction’ that even than cooperation
in not feasible, i. e. the unique subgame-perfect Nash-equilibrium is
that both—neither the buyer nor the supplier—invests in each period.
To put formally: Iˆt = (Iˆ
U
t = 0, Iˆ
D
t = 0), ∀t = 0, . . . , T .
15 Hence, the
following proposition can be concluded.
PROPOSITION 3. If the game Γ(T ) will be repeated finitely, then the
only unique Nash-equilibrium is that in each stage t = 1, . . . , T of game
Γ neither the buyer nor the supplier makes an investment. Formally,
the Nash-equilibrium is given by
Iˆt = (Iˆ
U
t = 0, Iˆ
D
t = 0), ∀t = 1, . . . , T.
In contrast to the last paragraph we now suppose that the game Γ is
repeated infinitely with discounting, i. e. t = 0, . . . ,∞.16 The worst-
case utility level of player i is termed as his ‘reservation utility’ and is
defined by
pii := min
I−i
max
Ii
pii(Ii, I−i), i = U,D.
The utility-level of player i within a stage game could not be lower that
his reservation utility.17 In our specific case the reservation utility of
player i is given by
pii = pii(0, 0), i = U,D.
15 Proof: suppose we are in the last period of the game Γ, i. e. t = T . As we have
seen in proposition 2 the only unique Nash-equilibrium is that neither the buyer nor
the supplier makes an investment. Because both will foresee this result in period
t = T − 1, both will also not cooperate in t = T − 1. And so on. 2
16 Equivalent to that we could imagine that the game is repeated finitely but with
a probability of break-off unknown to both of the players. For a brief discussion
which model-concept is adequate in which situation see Osborne and Rubinstein
(1998), p. 135.
17 When the stage game is repeated in time, then the average of player i’s payoffs
could not be lower than his reservation utility.
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8The most rigid way to motivate a player to make an investment is the
so-called ‘grim-trigger’-strategy. Within this strategy the reservation
utility of the opponent player is used as treat-point, i. e. the player who
deviates from the cooperative path will be punished with his reservation
utility in all succeeding periods. Hence, the ‘grim-trigger’-strategy of
player i in period t of our game is formally defined as
for t = 0: Ii0 = 1,
for t ≥ 1: Iit(ht) =
{
1 if ht = {(1, 1), . . . , (1, 1)};
0 else;
i = U,D,
where ht denotes the history of the game Γ in period t. To verify under
which conditions cooperation is profitable, we have to show at which
discount rate the profit of one-sided deviation is smaller than the lasting
gain of profit by cooperation. Therefore we define the discount rate for
player i18 δi ∈ [0, 1] as δi = 1
1+ri
, where ri ∈ IR+ denotes the interest
rate of player i.19 Additionally we assume that the discount rate is
equal for both players i = U,D. In the following we use the infinite
discounted profits of player i as decision criteria of player i. Hence, the
profit of i is defined by
pii =
∞∑
t=0
(δi)tpii(It) =
1
1− δi
pii(It), i = U,D.
To estimate the interval of δi within which cooperation is profitable,
we have to compare the profit of one-sided deviation with the profit
of lasting cooperation. Let us illustrate this point within our game
Γ. Does e. g. player −i use the ‘grim-trigger’-strategy, then player i
will get an one-time profit of pii(0, 1) by one-sided deviation in period
t = 020. Because player −i is using the ‘grim-trigger’-strategy, after
period t = 0 player i will only get a profit of pii(0, 0) in all succeed-
ing periods. Therefore it follows that the profit of lasting cooperation
must exceed the profit of one-sided deviation for cooperation to be
18 There is a closely relation between the discount and the interest rate. If the
interest rate goes to infinitely ri →∞, then all future payoffs become irrelevant, i. e.
δi → 0. On the other hand, if the interest rate goes to zero ri → 0, then the discount
rate goes to 1, i. e. δi → 1 and thereby all future payoff will evenly weighted.
19 In the case of a steady interest rate, which is exactly the case within our model,
the discount rate could also be interpreted as δi = e−τr
i
, where τ denotes the
distance between the to periods.
20 This is also the maximal profit which can be made by one-sided deviation of one
player, because future profits are discounted. Because of this, the maximal profit by
one-sided deviation can be realized by deviation as soon as possible, respectively in
period t = 0.
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9sustainable. Hence, formally cooperation can only be achieved if
pii(0, 1) +
δi
1− δi
pii(0, 0) ≤
1
1− δi
pii(1, 1), i = U,D,
respectively if
pii(0, 1) − pii(1, 1) ≤
δi
1− δi
(
pii(1, 1) − pii(0, 0)
)
, i = U,D.
From the above follows that δi must fulfill the condition
δi ≥
pii(0, 1) − pii(1, 1)
pii(0, 1) − pii(0, 0)
:= δi, i = U,D.
Therefore cooperation is feasible for all discount rates δi ∈ [δi, 1],
respectively for all interest rates ri ∈ [0, ri]. This means, that the
probability of cooperation is decreasing with the increasing impatience
of player i. This is one version of the well-known folk theorem21, which
is stated in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 4. In an infinite repeated version of the game Γ(∞)
both—the supplier and the buyer—make an investment if their discount
rate δi fulfills the condition
δi ≥
pii(0, 1) − pii(1, 1)
pii(0, 1) − pii(0, 0)
, i = U,D.
This means, that the discount rate δ must lie within the interval δi ∈
[δi, 1] to make cooperation feasible.
2.4. Impact of Decreasing Transaction Costs
After we have seen that cooperation can be achieved if both players
are patient enough, we now will investigate the impact of decreasing
transaction costs on our bilateral relationship. To incorporate this fact
in our model we suppose that the buyer refuses to take a relation with
the supplier if the supplier does not makes an investment, i. e. if he
plays IU = 0. Additionally to that, the buyer has now the possibility to
look for an alternative trading partner on an electronic market with n ∈
IN potential partners, respectively potential suppliers. The hierarchical
structure of this game is illustrated in figure 3.
21 For this interpretation of the folk theorem see Friedman (1971). For further in-
terpretations of the folk theorem see e. g. Rubinstein (1979), Fudenberg and Maskin
(1986) and Aumann and Shapley (1994).
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Figure 3. Illustration of a vertical buyer-supplier relation with an alternative
electronic market
With the introducing of the new stage our game is now a bit more com-
plex. First in period t = 0 both—the buyer and the supplier—decide
about the level of investment. If the supplier make an investment, the
bargaining process between the buyer and the supplier about the price
starts in period t = 1. In contrast to that, if the supplier does not
make an investment, then the buyer will look for an suitable alternative
supplier on the alternative electronic market in period t = 3 and the
bargaining process will be skipped. The structure of our new game is
shown in figure 4.
0 1 2 t
Buyer and
supplier decide over
IU and ID
Bargaining over
the price p
Buyer searches
on an alternative
market
If the supplier
does not invest
Figure 4. Game structure of the model with an alternative market
To investigate the behavior of the buyer within our model we apply a
simple search model22 in the case that the supplier does not cooperate,
i. e. the supplier does not make an investment. We assume that the
prices on this market are differentiated and exogenous given, i. e. that
this market is not a polypolistic one. Without a loss of generality we
want to suppose that the supplier i, i = 1, . . . , n asks the price pi = i.
This means, that supplier 1 asks the price p1 = 1, supplier 2 asks the
price p2 = 2, and so forth. This is illustrated in figure 5. In addition
to that we assume that the prices will be static over time. The buyer
knows the distribution of the prices, but he does not exactly know
which supplier asks for which price. This means, that the buyer knows
there exists n prices in the order of p = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n, but he does not
22 For the first work on search theory see Stigler (1951). For more recent work see
Rothschild (1974), Weitzmann (1979), Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989). For a good
survey see McMillan and Rothschild (1994). The following search model is based on
Shy. See Shy (1988), pp. 428.
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Figure 5. Distribution of the prices
know the exact price which will be asked by a specific supplier. The
search induces fixed search costs of s > 0 per inquiry, respectively
search request, on the buyer. This means, that the buyer has two
options after he has received a price offer from one specific supplier: he
either can accept the actual price offer at a price of p or he can place
another search request at the costs of s. This type of search behavior is
known as ‘sequential search’. Thereby we suppose that the search costs
depend on a technology parameter α ∈ {α,α}, which indicates how
well developed the electronic search function on this market is. From
this it follows, that the search costs of the buyer per search request are
s(α). Additionally we assume that s′(α) < 0 and s′′(α) > 0.23 We also
suppose that the profit of the buyer is in any case bigger than when he
initiates bilateral bargaining with the supplier U , i. e. that
piD(p(s(α), n)) > piD(0, 0), ∀α ∈ {α,α}, n
and
piD(p(s(α), n)) > piD(0, 1), ∀α ∈ {α,α}, n.
Technically spoken, the buyer has to solve a dynamic optimization
problem with each search request. If thereby the distribution of the
prices on the market is stationary24, as in our example, then this
dynamic optimization problem could be reduced to a simple decision
rule.25
23 This means, that the search costs decrease by an increasingly well developed
search function, but with a decreasing rate.
24 This means, that the distribution of the prices does not change in time and the
time horizon is finite.
25 For the proof of this proposition see Lippman and McCall (1976).
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Let us assume that the buyer starts a search request at a particular
supplier and gets a price offer of p. Additionally let us define ϑ(p) as the
expected price reduction of the buyer, if he starts an additional search
request when he has already a price offer p in hand. Because each price
is pi has an equal probability of g(pi) =
1
n
, ∀i, ϑ(p) is defined by
ϑ(p) :=
p∑
i=1
g(pi)(p− i) =
p∑
i=1
1
n
(p− i) =
p− 1
n
+
p− 2
n
+ . . .+
1
n
. (2)
In other words: the profit of an additional search request—if the buyer
already holds a price offer p in hand—equals whose expected price re-
duction. This also equals the expected profit of finding a price reduction
by one unit of money p−1
n
plus the expected profit of finding a price
reduction by two units of money p−2
n
, and so on. To use equation (2)
in our model we first need the following lemma.
LEMMA 5. The sum of J numbers can be calculated by
J∑
j=1
j := 1 + 2 + . . .+ J =
J(J + 1)
2
.
With the help of lemma 5 we then come to the following lemma.
LEMMA 6. The function ϑ(p) which is defined by equation (2) and
can be written as
ϑ(p) =
p2 − p
2n
.
We now take a closer look at the two options of our buyer after he
has a price offer p in hand. If he accepts this price offer, then he has
to pay price p and the search process is finished. On the other hand,
he can continue his search and therefore has to bear the search costs
s(α). Formally spoken: the buyer, if he holds already a price offer of p
in hand, minimizes
ξ(p) =
{
p, he buys the good;
s(α) + p− ϑ(p), he performs a further search.
(3)
Equation (3) shows that a cost-minimizing buyer stops his search, if
p ≤ s(α) + p − ϑ(p). On the other hand the buyer will continue to
search, if p > s(α)+ p−ϑ(p). From this fact we can state the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 7. A buyer who holds a price offer p in hand will
continue his search, if the expected price reduction of an additional
B2B.tex; 7/05/2004; 10:51; p.12
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Figure 6. Reservation-price strategy
search exceeds the search costs of an additional search request. Formally
this means, that the buyer only continues to search, if the price offer p
he already holds in hand fulfills the condition
ϑ(p) > s(α).
The search strategy described in proposition 7 is known as so-called
‘reservation-price strategy’, where the reservation-price is definition by
the following definition.
DEFINITION 8. A price p˜ is called reservation-price, if he fulfills the
condition
ϑ(p˜) = s(α).
Figure 6 illustrates a typical function of a reservation-price strategy of
a buyer. In figure 6 the buyer gets a price offer p from a supplier. If
p ≤ p˜, then then buyer will stop his search and buys the good at once at
price p. On the other hand, if the buyer recognizes a price p > p˜, then
he starts an additional search request, to accept or reject the following
price offer, depending on the fact if p ≤ p˜ or p > p˜.
Now let us calculate the reservation-price strategy of the buyer.
From definition (8) it is quite clear that the reservation-price is implicit
defined by ξ(p˜) = s(α). Hence, because of lemma 6, the reservation-
price can be calculated by solving the equation
ϑ(p˜) =
p˜2 − p˜
2n
= s(α)
⇔ p˜2 − p˜− 2ns(α) = 0.
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From the quadratic equation above results26 a reservation-price of
p˜ =
1 +
√
1 + 8ns(α)
2
. (4)
A closer look at equation (4) reveals some interesting properties of the
reservation-price which are combined in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 9. The reservation-price of a buyer p˜ fulfills the fol-
lowing conditions:
1. If the search costs come negligibly small, the buyer will continue his
search until he will get the lowest price offer. Formally spoken this
means if s(α)→ 0, p˜→ 1.
2. An increase of the search costs results in an increase of the reser-
vation price of the buyer.
3. An increase of the number of high-price suppliers, respectively in-
creasing n, leads to an increase of the reservation-price of the buyer.
Part two of proposition 9 states that if the search costs increase, the
buyer is willing to buy at a higher price to avoid these additional
search costs. Up to now we have specified if it is possible for the buyer
costlessly to return to a previously visited supplier to accept his price
offer afterwards.27 The following proposition explains why we do not
have to make an assumption about this fact in our context.
PROPOSITION 10. Even if it is possible for a buyer in a sequential
search costlessly to return to a previously visited supplier from whom
he his has already received a price offer p to afterwards accept his offer,
he will never do so.
The above result follows straightforward from the fact that the buyer
has already rejected the offer. For the exact proof consult the appendix.
Now let us take a closed at the profit of the buyer D. The profit in the
case of a reservation-price p˜ on an alternative market is
p˜iD(p˜(s(α), n)) = v(ID)− p˜(s(α), n) − ID. (5)
To decide wether the buyer will make an investment or not, he has to
solve the optimization problem
max
ID∈{0,1}
p˜iD(p˜(s(α), n)) = v(ID)− p˜(s(α), n) − ID.
26 This is the case, because we want to rule out negative prices and because from
n, s > 0 it follows that
√
1 + 8ns(α) > 1. Hence, only the positive root of the
quadratic equation is relevant.
27 This type of search is commonly known as ‘search with recall’.
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Table II. Bi-matrix of the induced game with an alternative market
ID
IU
0 1
0
˜piD(0, 0),
piU (0, 0)
piD(0, 1),
piU (1, 0)
1
piD(1, 0),
piU (0, 1)
piD(1, 1),
piU (1, 1)
From this it follows that the buyer now invests, respectively he chooses
IˆD = 1, because now he is able to acquire the whole marginal profit
of his investment privately.28 Let us now investigate the behavior of
the profit of the buyer in dependance on the height of the search costs.
Therefore we partially derive the profit of the buyer to α, given by
equation (5), so it results
∂p˜iD(p˜(s(α), n))
∂α
= −
2ns′(α)
n
√
1 + 8ns(α)
. (6)
An inspection of equation (6) shows that, according to our assumption
(cause s′(α) < 0 and n ∈ IN), the numerator is smaller than zero and
that the denominator, according to n ∈ IN and s(α) > 0, is bigger than
zero. Therefore it follows that equation (6) increases with increasing α.
Hence,
∂p˜iD(p˜(s(α), n))
∂α
> 0.
Because of the modified profit of the buyer p˜iD we now have to look at a
slightly different stage game Γ˜, which is shown in figure II. In compar-
ison to the stage game Γ without an alternative market in figure I we
see, that the prohibitive utility of the buyer D has been increased from
piD(0, 0) to p˜iD(0, 0).29 The discount rate δD which makes cooperation
feasible has to fulfill the condition
δ˜D ≥
piD(0, 1) − piD(1, 1)
piD(0, 1) − p˜iD(0, 0)
:= δ˜
D
. (7)
From the assumption in equation (1) it follows that
p˜iD(0, 0) > piD(0, 0).
Finally, in connection with equation (7) this means that
δ˜
D
> δD.
28 This result follows from the assumption that ∆v > 1.
29 This is true due to equation (1).
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Because now the buyer and the supplier have different discount rates,
the discount rate which makes cooperation feasible is now determinated
by the maximum of the both discount rates, respectively
δ˜ := max{δU , δ˜
D
} = δ˜
D
.
Altogether this means, that the discount rate which makes cooperation
feasible is higher in a situation with an existing alternative market than
in a situation without one. Or, to put it formally
[δ˜
D
, 1] < [δi, 1], i = U,D.
Recapitulatory this means, that in our model cooperative behavior will
become less probable with the existence of an alternative market, which
is summarized in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 11. In an infinitely repeated version of the game Γ(∞),
in which one of the players has access to an alternative electronic mar-
ket, the prohibitive utility of the player who has this access will increase.
Therefore the probability of cooperative behavior will decrease.
3. Discussion
Our analysis shows the impact of relation-specific assets in an incom-
plete contracts environment on the level of investment. We have seen
that the resulting investment level is always welfare-inferior. Addi-
tionally, we have seen that even finite repeated interaction does not
change this result. In contrast to this, infinite interaction does—but
only if both players are sufficiently patient. Finally, we have seen that
the existence of an alternative electronic market can have an impact
on the willingness to cooperate between firms. Within our setting the
willingness to cooperate of the buyer declines.
Our analysis was based on a rather simple model. Nevertheless the
model is appropriate for becoming a first intuition about the interfirm
organizational consequences of electronic markets. But due to the sim-
plicity of the model, there is much room for extensions. First of all
you could think about different distribution of the prices, respectively
price dispersion. This would have effects on the reservation-price, and
therefore effects on the results. In addition to that you could think
about the application of different search strategies. This would also
effect the above results. Furthermore, it would be useful to investigate
what happens if also the supplier has the possibility to search for an
alternative buyer. This would transform the model into a matching
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model. Also the investigation of the case of different discount rates
for the buyer and the supplier—which could be result from different
planning horizons—could have impacts on the results.
One assumption of our model was, that the number of firms on the
alternative market is exogenously given. But this must not be the case.
For instance, you could imagine to build in an endogenously termi-
nated number of firms, which could for instance result from different
technology parameters α. In addition to this we have assumed, that
the search will strictly result in a higher profit for the searcher. But
this must not be the case. This fact could e. g. investigated by an more
exactly specification of the value and cost function. Also a more exactly
specification of the market with regard to the price-building process
and to restricted market access would be meaningful extensions, cause
in reality electronic markets are very heterogenous. There could also
be won useful insights by including the above model in a much more
extensive framework—e. g. for a whole industry with several bilateral
trading relations—to determine the dominant coordination structure
of his particular industry.
In addition to all the analytical extensions, an empirical validation
of the shown results is necessary to verify the shown results. Generally
much more research about the welfare impacts of electronic markets is
needed.
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Appendix
Proof (of Lemma 5). Let us denote the sum
∑J
j=1 with φ and let us
look at the sum
1 + 2 + s3 + . . . + J +
J + J − 1 + J − 2 + . . . + 1 = 2φ.
Because each column adds up to J + 1 and there exist J columns, it
follows that 2φ = J(J + 1). Hence, φ = J(J+1)2 . 2
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Proof (of Lemma 6). By the definition resulting from equation (2)
we know that ϑ(p) := 1+2+...+(p−1)
n
. From this, in conjunction with
lemma 5, it follows that ϑ(p) = (p−1)p2 =
p2−p
2n . 2
Proof (of Proposition 10). Since the buyer employs a reservation-
price strategy, he will always buy if p ≤ p˜ and never buy if p > p˜.
Hence, if he had not bought at a previously visited supplier—because
the supplier asked for a price p > p˜—and we have additionally assumed
that the prices of the suppliers are static in time, then the buyer has
no incentive to return to the previously visited supplier. 2
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